RECENT CASES.
ACcOUNT-PENNSYLVANIA PLXCTICE ACT, 1915-An action of account
being brought, it was held, that account is not assumpsit and hence not within
the Practice Act. Masitis v. St. Vincent Society. 25 D. R. (Pa: 90T.
The Practice Act applies to actions of assumpsit and trespass only. P. L.
1915, 483- By the Act of May 25, 1887, P. L. 271, the actions of assumpsit,
debt and covenant are to. be sued in the name of assumpsit. Account is not
included.
On showing accountability, the plaintiff could sue in debt or account by
1597. Account originally lay against bailiffs. Y. B. 43 E. III, F. 21, pl. i1.
It was extended to guardians in socage by statute. Y. B. 21 E. IV, 10, pl. 30,
and to receivers by a fiction that the defendant was the plaintiff's bailiff.
Y. B. 41 E. III, 10, pl. 5. Later the ditinction between debt and account,
strictly made in the earlier cases, Y. B. 6 H. IV, 7, pl. 33, began to break
down, Y. B. 18 E. IV, 23, pl. 5, and, finally, where the defendant was accoun t able, the plaintiff had an option of debt on account. Lincoln v. Topliff, Cro.
El. 644 (1597); Clark's Case, Godbolt 210 (1612).
Indebitatus superseded
debt, and after doubt, Hussey v. Fiddall, 12 Mod. 324 (16g), it was held
that indebitatus would not lie against a factor on evidence of accountability.
Lincoln v. Parr, 2 Keble 781 (1671). This was overruled by Lord Mansfield
in Dale v. Sollet, 4 Burrow 2133 (1767).
Pennsylvania seems to allow indebitatus to lie on evidence of accountability, Giles v. McKinney, 6 W. & S. 78 (1843), by taking the "money had
and received to the plaintiff's use" count literally. See C. C. Langdell, 2 Harv.
L. R. 24I, 254,255.
In the absence of any equity court, the scope of the action of
account was widened, James v. Browne, i Dallas 339 (Pa. 1788), but debt,
account and assumpsit seem to have been allowed at the plaintiff's option
when the defendant was accountable. Bredin v. Dwen, 2 Watts 95 (Pa. 1833).
It is only when the accounts are very complicated or when other equities
intervene, Stitzer v. Fowler, 214 Pa. 117 (igo6), that assumpsit is not
allowed; then the remedy must be a bill in equity for an accounting. Reeside
v. Reeside, 49 Pa. 332 (1865) ; Burton v. Trainer, 27 Pa. Super. 626 (1905).
Though the existence of the two actions for the same situation does not
preclude the possibility of account being brought, yet, unless the plaintiff has
distinctly labelled his action as account, it should be construed as debt, since
by section ig of the Practice Act the defendant may be obliged to account in
an action of assumpsit.
See also Crawford D. Hening, 43 U. PA. L. REV. 764; J. B. Ames, 3 Sel.
Essays Anglo-American Legal His. 259, 295; M. C. Klingelsmith's Statham,
note, p. 20.
BANKs-DEPOSITs-RELATION OF BANK AND DEPOSITOR-A depositor died
leaving an insolvent estate, the bank holding certain notes of his not due at
the time of his death Held: The bank can apply the balance of the deposit
as it existed at the depositor's death towards debts due from him to the bank.
Laighton et al. v. Brookline Trust Co., 114 N. E. 671.
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It is the universal rule that the relation of bank and depositor is that of
debtor and creditor, the property in the money deposited becoming vested in
the bank. Tallapoosa County Bank v. Salmon, 68 So. 542 (Ala. 1916) ; Town
of East Chester v. Mt. Vernon Trust Co., i59 N. Y. S. 289 (i916) ; Minn. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Tagus State Bank, 158 N. W. io63 (N. D. 1916). The bank
may apply deposits on notes due from the depositor, permission to do this
being implied from the relation. Shuman v. Citizens' State Bank of Rugby,
169 S. W. 777 (Ark. x914) ; Desha Bank & Trust Co. v. Quilling, 176 S. W.
132 (Ark. 1915) ; Gunn v. Stockyards State Bank, 155 Pac. 796 (Kan. i916).
The bank's right of application, however, does not prevent the depositor frorfi
applying his deposits differently, for the contract is that the bank will honor
the depositor's checks. First Natl. Bank v. Hall, In9 Ala. 64 (i898). In order
for the bank to set off deposits the debts must be mutual, Niblack v. Park
Natl. Bank, 169 Ill. 517 (i897) ; Smith v. Sanborn State Bank, i47 Ia. 64o
(i9io) ; and this right of set-off exists against the executor or representative
of the depositor. Little's Adminr. v. City Natl. Bank of Fulton, 115 Ky. 629
(i9o3). To apply a deposit to an indebtedness, the indebtedness must be due
and payable, Dougherty v. Central Natl. Bank, 93 Pa. St. 227 (i88o) ; Gibbons
v. Hecox, io5 Mich. 5o9 (1895) ; but if the debtor is insolvent the weight of
authority favors the set-off of unmatured debts, Nashville Trust Co. v. Fourth
Natl. Bank of Nashville, 9i Tenn. 336 (i89i), and see cases collected in note
in 15 L. R. A. 71L
CARRIERs-FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AcT-WHEN IS AN EMPLOYEE
ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE?-A fireman of a switching engine was

killed while moving an intrastate car. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky
treated this as conclusive that he was not injured while engaged in interstate
commerce. Held: This was error, "for if . . . this movement was simply
for the purpose of reaching and moving an interstate car, the purpose would
control and the business would be interstate. The difference is marked
between a mere expectation that the act done would be followed by other
work of a different character, . . . and doing the act for the purpose of
furthering the later work." Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Parker, 37
Sup. Ct. Rep. 4.
The nice questions arising of whether an injury to a railroad employee
comes within the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and the tests which have
been suggested for determining them are discussed by note writers in 63
U. PA. L. REv. goo and 64 Ibid. 312.
As pointed out in the principal case, where the act which the injured
person was doing at the time of the accident was for the purpose of furthering the later work of interstate commerce, the case comes within the act, as
the following illustrates: A fireman oiling his engine by which an intrastate
train containing two cars from without the state was to be drawn. North
Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 (1914). A brakeman placing
two intrastate cars on a siding before- proceeding with his train on the interA brakeman
state journey. New York Central v. Carr, 238 U. S. 26o (915).
uncoupling two intrastate cars preparatory to placing two interstate cars on a.
private switch. Pennsylvania Co. Y. Donat, 239 U. S. 50 (1915). Running an
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engine destined beyond the state on an order between two points within the
state. Rock Island Ry. v. Wright, 239 U. S. 548 (1916) ; Hein v. Great Northern R. R. Co., 159 N. W. 14 (N. D. 1916). A brakeman on an intrastate
train which has one car loaded with interstate freight. Waters v. Guile, 234
Fed. 532 (iqx6). A car repairer working on an interstate car temporarily
stopped in the yards. Norfolk & WN.Ry. Co. v. Shorts, 171 Ky. 641 (1916).
Switching a train in which there is one interstate car, Whalen v. N. Y., etc.,
R. R. Co., 159 N. Y. S. 244 (i916) ; and this applies if the switching crew is
moving empty interstate cars of another company in the common yards.
Ruppel v. New York Central, 171 App. Div. 832 (N. Y. 1916). Switching a
refrigerator car from an ice house to a warehouse, where it was to be
loaded with freight for points outside the state. Aldread v. Northern Pacific
Ry. Co., 16o Pac. 429 (Wash. 1916). Removing intrastate cars from a repair
siding preparatory to placing interstate cars on it. Bolch v. Chicago, etc., Ry.
Co., go Wash. 47 (i9i6). A hostler walking through the yards after having
fitted out an interstate engine. Hinson v. Atlanta, etc., Air Line Ry. Co., (o
S. E. 772 (N. C. i916). A switchman switching a.car to be taken to another
place to be loaded with interstate freight. Christy v. Wabash R. R. Co., 19r
S. W. 241 (Mo. 1917).

But where the present work was intrastate with a mere expectation that
later work will be interstate, the case does not come within the act. As a
switching crew delivering cars from one part of the city to another. Illinois
Central R. R. Co. v. Beherns, 233 U. S. 473 (1914).

Or a brakeman on his

way to requisition supplies for a subsequent uncertain trip. McBain v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co.,

52

Mont. 578 (1916).

Further annotations on this subject will be found in 63 U. PA. L. REv.
458 and 64 Ibid. 752.
CORPORATIONS -

Ultra Vires AcTs

-

NECESSITY OF RETURN OF PROFITS

DERIVED TO MAKE DEFENSE AVAILALE-Bill in equity to cancel bonds issued

in payment of corporate notes, on the ground that their issue was ultra vires.
No offer was made to return the notes. Held: As long as the corporation
retains the profits of a transaction, it will be estopped to set up the fact that
it was ultra vires. Wrightsville Hardware Co. v. McElroy, g8 Ati. (Pa.) 1O52.
Though the defense of ultra vires is looked on with great disfavor in
some jurisdictions, it is generally admitted where the act is expressly prohibited by the charter or a statute, Kilbourn City v. So. Wisconsin Power Co.,
149 Wis. r68 (1912), or the contract is purely executory. Savannah Ice Co.
When the contract has
v. Canal-Louisiana Bank, 12 Ga. App. 818 (1913).
been fully executed by both parties, as a general rule the courts will not interfere. Parish v. Wheeler, 22 N. Y. 494 (r86o).
It is when the contract has been executed on one side only, or where
benefits have been received under it that the difficulty arises. In many jurisdictions in such cases an action can be maintained against the corporation on
the contract, the corporation being estopped to deny liability, Kellogg-Mackay
Co. v. Havre Hotel Co., i99. Fed. Y27 (1912) ; and an offer to repay premiums
paid on an ultra vires contract of insurance will not make the defense admissi-
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ble after the loss has occurred. Denver Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, 9 Col.
II (1885).
But the weight of authority is that an ultra vires contract cannot be the
foundation of an action, and either.party may set up that defense. Davis v.
Old Colony R. R. Co., 131 Mass. 258 (i881). The party who has paid the
consideration may, however, recover it back in an appropriate action. Rankin
v. Emigh, 218 U. S. 27 (1909). No amount of performance can, under the
rule in these states, give the contract any validity. Ogdensburg R. R. v.
Vermont R. R., 4 Hun 268 (N. Y. 1875). But in accordance with the rule in
the principal case, no recovery can be had by either party unless the benefits
received by that party are first returned to the other. Madison Ave. Church
v. Oliver Street Church, 73 N. Y. 82 (1878).
EVIDENcE-BEST EVIDENCE-PREsUMPTION FROm FAILURE TO PRODucE-In
a proceeding to deport a Chinese person, the only evidence introduced was a
sworn statement that accused had been seen in Mexico within three years, the
identification of accused being made by a photograph, though it might as easily
have been made in person. No other investigations were made. Held: Since
better evidence of accused's presence in Mexico might easily have been procured and was not, it is presumed that had it been produced it would have
been unfavorable to the case. Backus v. Owe Sam Goon, 235 Fed. 847.
The so-called "best evidence rule" applies only to those cases where proof
of a fact is required to be of a certain character, no other proof being admitted, unless absence of required proof is explained; but the reason of it applies
equally to other cases, and so where inferior evidence of a fact is produced,
though it is admissible, the unexplained failure to produce better evidence
raises the presumption that if it were produced, it would prove unfavorable, if
not adverse, to the case. Clifton v. U. S., 45 U. S. 242 (1846). Though it is
generally said that a "presumption" of unfavorableness is raised, what is meant
is merely that the jury may draw inferences against the party failing td
produce the better proof. Hall v. Vanderpool, 156 Pa. 152 (1893) ; Sugarman
v. Brengel, 68 App. Div. 377 (N. Y. 19o2). But see contra, Union Trust Co.
v. McClellan, 40 XV. Va. 405 (1895), and Cooper v. Upton, 65 W. Va. 4oi
(1909).
The ft.lowing cases are illustrations of the circumstances which warrant
a jury in drawing strong inferences against the party at fault: U. P. Ry. Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (i8go), unreasonable refusal to show wounds in an
action for personal injuries; Norguet v. Paramount Worsted Mills, 177 Fed.
970 (19IO), non-production of available witnesses; Rice v. Com., IO Pa. 408
(1883), failure of prosecution to call available witness to corroborate doubtful
testimony; Wolff v. "The Vaderland," 18 Fed. 733 (1883), failure to preserve
available evidence; Stephenson v. Kilpatrick, 166 Mo. 262 (igoi), failure of a
party charged with fraud to testify in his own behalf, and Fountain v. Callaway Co., r44 Ga. 55o (1914), failure of a party to produce evidence in his
exclusive control.
The silence of the accused as to a matter of which he has knowledge
does not, however, authorize a finding against him where there is a total lack
of affirmative proof. Corbin & Co. v. U. S., 181 Fed. 296 (191o). And where
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a witness is equally accessible to both parties, but is called by neither, no inferences may be drawn. Fitzpatrick v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 112 N. E. 94
(Mass. i916). So also in such case, no inference is to be drawn against one
party becauge the witness was called by the other. Gibson v. Mining Co., 1,6
Pac. 56 (Cal. x916).
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

AcT-IxJURY AR!,INC'

OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT-A night watchman was killed and robbed by a

fellow-employee, no attempt being made to rob the mill. Held: The death
did not arise out of the employment. Walther v. American Paper Co., 99 Ati.

(N. J.) 263.
It is now settled, both in England and America, that an assault on an
employee is an accident within the terms of the compensation acts. Trim
Joint District School v. Kelly. [1914] W. C. & Ins. C. 359 (Eng.): Western
Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, I5r Pac. 398 (Cal. 1915) ; In re Heitz, 1i2 N. E.
750 (N. Y.).

The difficult question is whether the assault arises out of the employment.
The general rule is that there must be a causal connection between the conditions under which the work must be performed and the resulting injury. In re
McNicol, 102 N. E. 697 (Mass. 1913)- This causal connection exists wl-en
there are risks incident to the employment likely to lead to assaults. Nis'et
v. Rayne, [I9IO] L. R. 2 K. B. 689 (Eng.), (cashier) ; Anderson v. Balfour,
[I9IO] Ir. Rep. 497 (Ireland), (gamekeeper) : State ex rel. v. District Court.
I58 N. W. 713 (Minn. 1916), (bartender). It has been held. that the risk of
being shot is not incidental to the ordinary employment of a night watchman.
In re Harbroe, iii N. E. 709 (Mass. 1916).

In such cases, it seems, a dis-

tinction is to be made when robbery is attempted on the property of the
employer. Schmoll v. Brewing Co., 97 Atl. 723 (N. J. 1916), and see the principal case.
Where the assault is by an intoxicated stranger, it is held not to arise out
of the employment, even though the employee at the time is in control of and
is protecting his employer's property. Mitchinson v. Day Bros., 6 B. W. C. C.
i9o (Eng. 1913). But if the assault is committed by a choleric drunken fellowemployee, the case is distinguished from an assault by a drunken stranger or
a sober fellow-employee, and is held to arise out of the employment. In re
McNicol, supra. This is also true where the assault is the remote cause of
the injury, and the employee's situation, as required by his employment, is
the proximate cause. Shaw v. McFarlane, 8 B. W. C. C. 382 (Scot. 1914).
In general, the injury received from an assault by a fellow-employee does
not arise out of the employment. Shaw v. Wigan Coal Co., 3 B. W. C. C. 8i
(Eng. I9Og) ; Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 95 Atl. IOO7 (N. J. 1915). But if the
assault is due to the employee's desire to have the employer's work done correctly, it does so arise. In re Heitz, supra. If the employer engages in an
altercation, and the employee goes to his aid, the consequent assault is held
not to be an injury arising out of the employment. Collins v. Collins. [1907]
2

Ir.

Rep. 1O4 (Ireland); Clark v. Clark, 155 N. W. 507 (Mich. 1915).

The

same rule applies if the employer attacks the employee. Blake v. Head, io6
L. T. 822 (Eng. 1912).
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MASTER AND SERVANT-WVORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-WALKING ON
RAILROAD TO WORK-A workman Was injured while walking to work on a

railroad, which was the shortest way to the place of, employment, and a way
sanctioned by the employer, although the employer did not own the railroad.
Held: The injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. Fox v.
Rees, 115 L. T. Rep. (Eng.) 358.
It is difficult to formulate a general rule in cases where the employee is
-injured while on his way to or from work. It has been held that the injury
does not arise in the course of the employment, if the employee is injured on
premises not owned by or under the control of the employer, even though he
has been instructed to go to and from work over that way. Holmes v.
Mackay, 8o L. T. Rep. 831 (Eng. 1899) ; De Constantin v. Public Service Com.,
83 S. E. 88 (W. Va. I914). But cf. the principal case. This is all the more
so if the employee contributed to the injury by incurring additional risks, such
as boarding a moving train. Jibb v. Chadwick & Co., 112 L. T. Rep. 878 (Eng.
1915). Generally, if the accident occurs on the premises of the employer and
the employee is using the customary way, the injury is compensable. Gare
v. Norton Hill Colliery Co., 2 B. W. C. C. 42 (Eng. I9O9); De Mann V.
Hydraulic Engineering Co., 159 N. W. 380 (Mich. 1916). However, it seems
that the accident must happen in close proximity to the place of actual employment, and the way must be a way continuous over the employer's premises.
Gilmour v. Dorman, Levy & Co., 4 B. W. C. C. 279 (Eng. 1911). Some courts
refuse compensation even though the injury arises on the employer's premises,
provided the employee could have taken a different route. Hilk v. Blair, 148
N. W. 243 (Mich. 1914).

The mere fact that the employer prepared the path on which the accident
occurred does not render the injury compensable. Walters v. Stanley Coal
Co., 4 B. W. C. C. 303 (Eng. 1911). The tendency seems to be toward the
doctrine of the principal case. When an employee is actually going to his
work upon a road provided by the employer, or permitted by him, and is
actually within the premises, any accident there occurring arises out of the
employment. Nicol v. Young & Co., 8 B. W. C. C. 395 (Scot. 1915). But if
the employee is on the employer's premises and deviates from the straight
path for purposes of his own, any injury received does not arise out of the
employment. Benson v. Lancashire Ry. Co., 89 L. T. Rep. 715 (Eng. 1904).
If there is only one way of approach, the injury is compensable, whether the
way is under the control of the employer or not. In re Sundine, lO5 N. E.
433 (Mass. 1914).

The Pennsylvania Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 738, makes provision for
compensation for injury received on the premises of the employer, under
certain conditions.
PROPERTY-HuSBAND AND WIFE-PowER OF HUSBAND TO MORTGAGE PROPERTY HELD AS TENANTS BY THE ENTIRETIES-Realty with a hous6 was con-

veyed to a married couple. The house was damaged by fire and the husband
refused to use insurance money to repair, whereupon the 'wife brought a bill
in equity to compel the husband to permit the application of this fund for
repairs. Held: Husband's rights to the rents and profits of estates held by
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the entireties were by his common law marital rights and not by reason of
the tenancy. Masterman v. Masterma,, 98 At. (Md.) 37.
At common law any land conveyed to a married couple was held as
tenants by the entireties and neither party had the power to alien the land
and cut off the right of survivorship. Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391 (1871) ;
Simpson v. Biffle, 63 Ark. 289 (1876). In McCubbin v. Stanford. 85 Md. 378
(1897), a mortgage executed by the husband was not permitted to be foreclosed against the wife. Evidence that the husband paid for land conveyed to
the husband and wife does not avoid the estate by entireties. White v. Woods,
io6 N. E. 536 (Ind. 1914). A judgment against the husband is no lien on
property held by entireties, Jordan v. Reynolds. 105 Md. 288 (1997) ; but a
joint judgment is effective, Frey v. McGraw, 127 Md. 23 (1915).
The husband may lease the land, -which lease is valid during husband's
life, Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mass. 219 (r886) ; Bank of Greenville v. Gointo.
161 N. C. 341 (1913) ; due to husband's common-law right to rents and profits.
The modern enabling statutes do not in general affect estates held by entireties and do not give the wife a right to crops grown thereon. Morrill v.
Morrill, 138 Mich. 112 (19o4). The husband's grantee's rights do not include
the cutting of timber, it being part of the freehold. Bynum v. Wicker, 141
N. C. 95 (io6). In Ewen v. Hart, 166 S. W. 315 (Mo. 19T4), a husband's
license to lay a sewer was upheld, but see. conlra, Wright v. Cottrell. 139
N. Y. S. 564 (1913).
Generally, any land conveyed to a married couple is held by the entireties,
Chandler v. Cheney, supra, but in Speas v. lVoodhouse, 77 S. E. Ioo (N. C.
1913), a partition deed by the wife's brother to the husband and wife was
held to give the wife the entire estate, though she and her privies may be
estopped to deny the estate by entireties. Yokley v. Superior Drill Co., 26 Ky.
L. R. 3o2 (19o4). A conveyance granting specified shares to a husband and
wife does not create the estate by entireties, Blease v. Anderson, 241 Pa. 198
(1913) ; or if intention of creating a tenancy in common is apparent. Holloway v. Green, 83 S. E. 243 (N. C. 1914). A deed to a married couple under a
void marriage seemingly results in a tenancy in common. Butler v. Butler.
157 N. Y. S. 188 (1915).
Certain states by statute have abolished all concurrent estates except
tenancies in common. Conn v. Boutwell, 58 So. 1O8 (Miss. 1912). Some
courts hold that the enabling statutes break down tenancies by entireties.
Kerner v. McDonald, 6o Neb. 663 (19oo); Michigan State Bk. v. Kern, 155
N. W. 502 (Mich. 1915).
See also articles in 58 U. PA. L. REv. 176 and 61 U. PA. L. REV. 476.
PROPERTY-TENANCY

IN

CoIMoN-AcQuIsITIoN

OF TAx

TITLE BY

ONE

TENANT-TImE FOR REDEMPTION BY COTENANT-Plaintiff, former owner of
undivided one-eighth share in mining property, filed a bill to be adjudged
owner against defendant company, former owner of other seven-eighths
share, which had bought in plaintiff's share five years after a tax sale to the
county. Held: Rule prohibiting one tenant in common from acquiring
adversely cotenant's interest does not apply where the interests of the tenants
in common are separately taxed and in general only gives delinquent tenant
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the right to redeem within a reasonable time.- Hanley v. Fed. Mining &
Smelting Co., 235 Fed. 769.
The general rule is that one tenant in common in buying in-any outstanding title claims is presumed to act for the benefit of all his cotenants.
Davis v. Chapman, 24 Fed. 674 (U. S. C. C. 1885). This rule is only one of
presumption and does not apply where an express Agreement permits such a
purchase. Waters v. Kolp, 34 App. D. C.575 (i91o)." The general rule has
been applied even where half of the title purchased was for the use of a third
party, Field v. Farmers' Bank, 11o Ky. 257 (igoi) ; or where the tenant purchaser was not in possession at any time'tax accrued and owed his cotenants
no special duty, Duson v. Roos, 123 La. 835 (igo); or where tenant purchased from mortgagee of property who bought it in at foreclosure sale, Eckert
v. Schmitt, nio Pac. 635 (Wash. igio) ; or where the wife of tenant in common
is the purchaser being deemed a cotenant by dower. Trumbull v. Bruce, 117
Pac. 472 (Wash. 1911). In Wilson v. Linder, 21 Idaho 516 (1912), it was held
that the general rule applied to 'remaindermen in common. In Biggins v.
Dufficy, 262 IIl. 26 (1914), it was held that purchasing tenant did not even
acquire color of title, but it is generally held that the delinquent tenant has
no enforceable rights without tender of his proportional contribution, Morris
v. Roseberry, 46 W. Va. 24 (1899); Allen v. Allen, 114 Wis. 6r5 (1902); and
after refusal to contribute the purchasing tenant has the benefit of the Statute
The right to
of Limitations. Phillips v. Wilmarth, 98 Iowa 32 (1896).
redeem must be exercised within a reasonable time. Starkweather v. Jenner,
216 U. S. 524 (igog); Brown v. Howard, 264 Mo. 466 (1915).
In Bennett v. Land Imp. Co., 23 Col. 470 (1897), it was held that where
there was no particular duty to cotenants to pay taxes one tenant could buy in
title for his own benefit. The rule does not apply to judicial sales. In re
Reynolds' Estate, 239 Pa. 314 (1913); Plant v. Plant, 154 Pac. io58 (Cal.
1916).
PROPERTY-WILLS-GIFT TO ILLEGITIMATE CHIL--A. testator, knowing his
mistress to be enceinte, made a codicil to his will which provided for any
other children he might have by her in addition to those already in esse. A
son was born after the testator's death, who claimed under the codicil. Held:
This was a gift to an illegitimate child defined by a reference to paternity
and was invalid for uncertainty. Re Homer, 115 L. T. R. (Eng.) 703.
The principal case is in accord with the general rule that if the illegitimate children are defined with reference to their paternity, the gift will fail
for uncertainty. It would necessitate an inquiry into the access or non-access
of others, the profligacy or immorality of the woman, signs of race or caste
or blood. In re Hastie's Trusts, 35 Chan. Div. 728 (Eng. 1887) ; Re Loveland,
94 L. T. R. 336 (Eng. 19o6). However, a gift to illegitimate children not born
at the date of the will, but to be born during the lifetime of the testator, is
good if they can be ascertained without inquiring into the fact of paternity.
Occleston v. Fullalove, L. R. 9 Ch. App. 147 (Eng. 1812) ; Re Loveland, supra;
A gift to the future illegitimate child
2 Jarman on Wills, 1748 (6th edition).
of a woman, if born in the lifetime of the testator, is valid, for no referenc&
to the parentage is necessary. Estate of Frogley (I905), P. 137 (Eng.) ; 2
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Jarman on Wills, 1764 (6th edition). See Professor Scott. Control of Property by the Dead, P. 634, supra.
The American authorities, though few in number, are in accord with the
rule of the principal case. When sufficiently designated, an illegitimate child
in esse or in ventra sa mere may take by will. Dunlap v. Robinson, 28-Ala.
ioo (1856) ; Hughes v. Knowlton, 37 Conn. 429 (1870) ; Kingsley v. Broward,
19 Fla. 722 (1883). "Children" prima facie means legitimate children. Gates
v. Seikert, 1:57 Mo. 1O65 (igoo); Bealafeld v. Slaughenhaupt, 213 Pa. 565
(19o6). In England slight peculiarities are allowed to show that by "children"
the testator meant to include his illegitimate children. Re Loveland, supra;
O'Loughlin v. Bellew (I9o6), I Ir. 487. "All the children of her body" was
held to include illegitimate children in Sullivan v. Parker, 113 N. Caro.301

(1893).
SALES-CHATTEL MORTGAGES-STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATION-SUFFICIENCY

-Where a mortgagor of chattels gave a bill of sale thereto, stating the consideration to have been paid, and was given a check which she cashed in the
presence of mortgagee's clerk, paying over a portion to mortgagee for a debt
not yet due, it was Held: That the consideration was not truly set fortha
within the English Bill of Sales Act. Parrone v. Equitable Investment Co.,
Ltd., 115 L. T. 194.
In England the bill of sale is used as a chattel mortgage. The Bill of
Sales Act (1878), Amendment Act (1882), 45 and 46 Vict. C. 43, Sec. 8,
provides that "Every bill of sale . . . shall truly set forth the consideration." Similar provisions are found in the American Chattel Mortgage Acts.
Ohio Stat., Sec. 4154, "Must state the amount secured"; Rev. Laws, Ch. 1O2,
Sec. 53, Mass. "Must state amount of loan with substantial accuracy";
N. J. P. L. 192o, p. 487, Sec. 4. "Must state amount of consideration and as
nearly as possible amount due and to grow due thereon," Md. Stat. 1846,
Sec. 271.
The English construction is strict. If the bill of sale is given to secure
a loan arising at the time of the giving of the bill, the retention by the biiiholder of part of the money for a debt not yet due does not constitute payment and the bill of sale is voided if that money was stated as part of the
consideration. Richardson v. Harris, 22 Q. B. D. 268 (1889), overruling
In re Haynes, 15 Ch. Div. 42 (1877). Payment to a third party at mortgagor's
request, or the settling of accounts already due is a good payment. Re
Harmony & Montague Co., L. R. 8 Ch. App. 407 (1873). Giving a check to
mortgagor is good payment if the mortgagor has the complete control of the
proceeds for an appreciable period, even though there is a collateral agreement to repay the proceeds to the mortgagee. Thomas v. Searles, 2 Q. B. D.
408 (i8gi). There must be no possibility of duress as in the principal case.
Re Davies, 77 P. T. R. 567 (1897).
The American construction is more liberal. The actual value of the consideration need not be shown, and part thereof may be for future adlances.
Buck v. Buck, 122 Pac. 466 (Cal. 1912). If the affidavit mistakes the consideration, but the annexed mortgage itself is accurate, the transaction will not be
Contra:
Metropolitan Co. v. Albrecht, 70 N. J. L. 149 (1903).
voided.

RECENT CASES "
Denton v. Griffith, 17 Md. 301 (186I). If the affidavit states "for money paid
in hand," and the real 'transaction was the cancelling of a debt, the mortgage
is avoided. Denton v. Griffith, supra.
The mortgaged goods must be described also. but it is sufficient if the
description is such as to render the goods capable of identification or put a
purchaser upon inquiry. Greiss v. Vilkopp, 12 Circt. Ct. R. 481 (Ohio 18gi);
Morrison v. Elzy, ioo Ill. App. 372 (1914).
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Loss-A surety bond conditioned "to indemnify and save harmless .
from any pecuniary loss resulting from the breach of any of the terms of the
contract" is one of indemnity against actual pecuniary loss, and the fact alone
that liability was incurred does not give rise to a cause of action against the
surety. Hoffman Co. v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 9 Atl. (Pa.) 414.
. "Where the indemnity is against liability, there is a right of recovery as
soon as liability is incurred; where it is against loss. by reason of liability,
there is no right of recovery until a loss occurs." Faulkner v. McHenry, 235
Pa. 298 (1912). In the first case, the indemnitee can recover as soon as his
liability is fixed. Illinois Surety Co., v. Maguire, 15o Wis. 544 (1912). In the
other' case, actual damage or loss must be alleged and proved before a right
of action accrues. Jenckes v. Rice, ii9 Ia. 451 (i9o3) ; Gould v. Tilton, 161
Ill. App. 142 (29It). Entry of judgment against him does not give the indemnitee a right to recover; it must be paid. Puget Sound Co. v. Insurance Co.,
52 Wash. 124 (r9og). But such loss may occur by the complete failure of one
party to carry out his agreement. Elmohan Co. v. People's Surety Co., 217
N. Y. 289 (1916).

As shown by the principal case, the important question in these cases
is the construction of the contract. The many cases which have arisen are
because of the uncertain language used. It is not difficult to express the
real intention and make the contract certain by using appropriate phraseology.
See Poe v. Philadelphia Casualty Co., ii8 Md. 347 (19rM).
TORTS-SLANDER-PRIVILEGE-BANKRUPT

CREDITORS' hTEETING-At

a meet-

ing of creditors of a bankrupt for the purpose of electing a trustee, slanderous
statements were made about one of the candidates for the position. Held:
This was a judicial proceeding and the statement being relevant, was absolutely privileged. Rogers v. Thompson, 99 Atl. (N. J.) 389.
The rule that statements made in the course of judicial proceedings are
absolutely privileged, if relevant to the subject under discussion, is generally
followed in the United States. Cooley v. Galyon, iog Tenn. I (I9O3). This
privilege attaches to complaints made-to a magistrate or sheriff in instituting
a criminal prosecution, Laing v. Mitten, 185 Mass. 233 (i9o4); statements in
the pleadings and answers in a civil suit, Gains v. Aetna Ins. Co., 1o4 Ky. 695
(i898) ; statements in petitions addressed to the court, Buohs v. Bacher, 6
Heisk. 395 (Tenn. i87i); Rosenberg v. Dworetsky, 139 App. Div. 517 (N. Y.
i9ro) ; statements in the judicial opinion, Valesh v. Prince, 159 N. Y. S: 598
(I916), and statements in counsel's brief presented to the appellate court.
Sickles v. Kling, 6o App. Div. 515 (N. Y. igoi).
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It has been held that an investigation by a grand jury is a judicial proceeding, Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325 (i9o6) ; as are also the.deliberations
of the trial jury. Dunham v. Powers, 42 Vt. i (1869). An investigation by
a legislative committee was held to be a judicial proceeding. Sheppard v.
Bryant, 191 Mass. 591 (igo6). On the other hand, it has been held that an
investigation conducted by a committee of the Board of Aldermen of a
municipality is not. Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 (1894). These cases
are distinguishable, the powers granted the committees being somewhat different. Absolute immunity was extended to statements made in the course of
an investigation by the board of trustees of a college into the character of its
president, on the ground that there was no difference between such a proceeding and a trial in a court of justice. Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N. C. 402 (9Ol).
But in England the rule is strictly limited to judicial bodies established by
law. Royal Aquarium Soc. v. Parkinson (1892), I Q. B. 431.
See article by Van Vechten Veeder in 9 Col. L. R. 463 at 483, et seq.
TORTS-TRADE BoycoTT-A shoemaker was expelled from the union. In
order to discipline him, the union procured his discharge and prevented him
from obtaining employment elsewhere. Held: This is an illegal boycott and
the shoemaker can recover damages. Shinsky v. Tracey, 114 N. E. (Mass.)
957.
It is generally accepted that a workman can recover against a union which
procures his discharge by threats or intimidation. A discussion of the leading
cases will be found in an article by William Draper Lewis, "Trade and Labor
Disputes," 53 Am. Law Reg. 465 (io5). The doctrine, however, is not without qualification. In some states, it has been held that the purpose of the boycott must be clearly illegal, or there is no redress. Davis v. United Portable
Hoisting Engineers, 28 App. Div. 396 (N. Y. 1898) ; Association v. Cumming, 65
N. Y. S.946 (19oo). If the purpose is illegal, then a strike for a closed shop
will be enjoined. A strike to close a single shop may be legal, but a strike to
close all the shops in the community is agaifist public policy and illegal.
Schwarcz v. International Garment Workers' Union, 124 N. Y. S.968 (19io).
It has been held that a strike is legal, and consequently it is legal to threaten
to strike. If the workman is discharged in consequence of the threat, he has
213 (1912) ; but see the dissentno remedy. Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill.
ing opinions.
If the workman is expelled from the union contrary to the by-laws, and
in consequence is discharged from his employment, he can recover damages
from the union. Brennan v. United Hatters, 13 N. J. L. 737 ('906). In the
principal case, the injured workman had been expelled from the union, and
the discharge was in the nature of punishment. The court took the view that
the union cannot discipline workmen after their connection with the union has
been severed.
The principal case is in accord with the Massachusetts doctrine and the
weight of authority. Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' Assembly, 77 Md. 396 (i893):
Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492 (igoo) ; Erdman v. Mitchell, 2o7 Pa. 79 (1903);
Carter v. Oster, 134 Mo. App. 146 (1goS).

RECENT CASES
TRUSTS-CHARITIES-VANT OF TRUSTEF-Property was bequeathed to two
trustees to be appointed by a synod, an unincorporated organization, to be
used in educating young ministers. Held: The bequest is invalid; there is
no one to enforce the trust. Ewell v. Sneed, 191 S. W. 131 (Tenn.).
The principal case is against the overwhelming weight of authority, the
almost universal rule being that equity will not suffer a charitable bequest to
fail for want of a trustee. Attorney-General v. Goodell, i8o Mass. 538 (1902) ;
Sawyer v. Dearstyne, 139 N. Y. S. 955 (1912). Thus, a provision that a trustee
be elected by "the people" was upheld. Heuser v. Harris, 42 Il. 425 (1867).
The cases do not depend on the statute, 43 Eliz., Chap. 4, nor on the existence
of the cy pres doctrine, nor on any prerogative power. It has been held that
the appointment of a trustee in order to save a charitable trust is merely the
exercise of the ordinary jurisdiction of a court of equity. Hitchcock v. Board
of Horde Missions, 259 Ill. 288 (1913) ; Eccles v. R. I. Hospital Trust Co., 98
Atl. 129 (R. I. I916). Where there are statutes providing for the appointment of a trustee, they are considered merely declaratory of the common law.
Frazier v. St. Luke's Church, I47 Pa. 256 (1892).
In the principal case, the reasoning is that the trust fails because there is
no officer in the state who can enforce the trust. In Maryland the same result
is reached, but largely because the beneficiary is not definitely determined and
the statute, 43 Eliz., Chap. 4, is not in force. State v. Trustees of M. E.
Church, 28 Md. 338 (1867). Some of the Virginia cases are in accord with
the principal case. Gallego v. Attorney-General, 3 Leigh 45o (Va. 1832). Due
to the influence of Vidal v. Girard's Executor, 2 How. 127 (U. S. Sup. 1834),
there are strong dicta in later cases looking in an opposite direction. Episcopal Society v. Churchman's Rep., 8o Va. 718 (i885). But see Fifield v. Van
Wyck, 94 Va. 557 (1897).

